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A type of transcendental argument for libertarian free will maintains 
that if acting freely requires the availability of alternative 
possibilities, and determinism holds, then one is not justified in 
asserting that there is no free will. More precisely: if an agent A is 
to be justified in asserting a proposition P (e.g. "there is no free 
will"), then A must also be able to assert not-P. Thus, if A is unable 
to assert not-P, due to determinism, then A is not justified in 
asserting P. While such arguments often appeal to principles with 
wide appeal, such as the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, they 
also require a commitment to principles that seem far less 
compelling, e.g. the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘able not to’ or 
the principle that having an obligation entails being responsible. It 
is argued here that these further principles are dubious, and that it 
will be difficult to construct a valid transcendental argument without 
them. 
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Transcendental arguments are typically aimed at refuting sceptical 
positions. What is distinctive about transcendental arguments is that they 
do not seek to challenge the sceptic’s premises directly. Rather, they might 
proceed in one of two ways: 
 
Firstly, a relatively modest form of transcendental argument may begin 
with some fact x that is taken to be uncontroversial or obvious (enough so 
that even the sceptic cannot escape being committed to it) and by arguing 
that the sceptic’s position is inconsistent with x. On this view, the sceptic’s 
argument is not self-refuting, but the sceptic’s own commitments cannot 
be rendered consistent with her conclusion. 
 
Secondly, a more ambitious form of transcendental argument seeks to 
establish that the sceptic’s stance is self-refuting, as opposed to merely 
being inconsistent with independently inescapable commitments. In this 
case, the argument will proceed first by identifying some fact x that is 
argued to be a necessary condition of the very possibility of the sceptic 
being able to assert her argument, and then by showing that the sceptic’s 
conclusion cannot possibly be true consistent with x. Thus, if the sceptic is 
able to put forward an argument at all, the argument will be self-refuting. 
The sceptic essentially proves her own conclusion false the moment she 
asserts it. 
 
Our aim is to pinpoint and assess some of the key commitments involved 
in constructing arguments of this sort, with a particular focus on ambitious 
transcendental arguments in favour of a libertarian stance in the free will 
debate. We maintain that the success of these arguments depends on 
whether we can defend not only the compelling principles that typically 
make these arguments appealing, but also some more dubious principles; 
those connecting our capacity to make rational choices not only with our 
ability to do so, but also with our ability to avoid doing so. 
 
 
2. Transcendental Argument 
 
Transcendental arguments are traditionally most strongly associated with 
Kant, who used the method to argue (primarily targeting Hume) that a 
priori concepts can be legitimately applied to objects of our experience, 
and to argue (primarily targeting Cartesian scepticism) against idealism 
(Kant, 1998/1781). Since Kant, the general method has commonly been 
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associated with responses to external world scepticism in epistemology.1 
It’s rarer for this argumentative strategy to be invoked in relation to free 
will, although Kant’s own work on free will certainly has echoes of this 
strategy, and there have been at least a handful of other notable examples. 
As far back as ancient Greece, Epicurus argues as follows: 
 
He who says that all things happen of necessity can hardly 
find fault with one who denies that all happens by necessity; 
for on his own theory the argument is voiced by necessity 
(Epicurus, 1964: fragment XL). 
 
Epicurus does not make it entirely clear why an argument that is voiced by 
necessity could not be a valid argument for all that. Presumably, the driving 
assumption is that an argument voiced by necessity is not voiced freely, 
but he does not clearly spell out why this is taken to undermine the 
conclusion of the argument. There are, however, a number of ways in 
which this stance might be motivated. 
 
While not usually regarded as an example of a transcendental argument, 
Kant’s own reasoning in relation to free will in final section of the 
Groundwork (1997/1785) and in the Critique of Practical Reason (1997/ 
1788) suggests, among other things, that one must presuppose one’s own 
freedom in order to practically act in the pursuit of rational ends. For 
instance, he argues: 
 
Now, one cannot possibly think of a reason that would 
consciously receive direction from any other quarter with 
respect to its judgements, since the subject would then 
attribute the determination of his judgement not to reason but 
to an impulse. Reason must regard itself as the author of its 
principles independently of alien influences; consequently, as 
practical reason or the will of a rational being it must regard 
itself as free, that is, the will of such being cannot be a will of 
his own except under the idea of freedom, and such a will 
must in a practical respect thus be attributed to every rational 
being (Kant 1997/1785). 
 
If we must presuppose our own freedom in order to act rationally, then, 
according to Kant, a commitment to free will is inescapable for any rational 
being. Moreover, if Kant is right to suppose that we cannot act rationally 
without presupposing that we have freedom of the sort that would be 
 
1 Most influentially, by Strawson (1966), but see also Putnam (1981), Peacocke (1989), 
Cassam (1999), and Stern (1998). 
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incompatible with determinism, then it seems to follow that it’s also an 
essential precondition of choosing to argue in favour of a sceptical outlook, 
at least insofar as one takes oneself to have any practical reason for doing 
so.2 
 
While Kant’s argument explicitly draws on worries about practical 
normativity, the Epicurean point could just as easily rest on worries about 
epistemic normativity. In the latter case, it will be our justification for 
believing or asserting a conclusion, rather than our justification for acting 
more broadly, which is taken to commit us to supposing ourselves to be 
free. Insofar as our status as either practically or theoretically rational 
entails a certain sort of responsiveness to normative pressures, and insofar 
as this can be linked with a libertarian understanding of freedom, either 
might provide a fruitful basis for a suitable transcendental argument for 
such freedom. 
 
More recently, Lockie (2018) has provided a number of detailed 
transcendental arguments for libertarianism, which draw on theorising 
about the relation between freedom, duty, and epistemic normativity, in 
order to show that any attempt to argue in favour of a deterministic or 
sceptical position must be self-refuting. 
 
Lockie’s argument rests on the idea that freedom is an essential component 
of epistemic justification. He also draws on the Kantian principle that 
‘ought’ implies ‘can’ in order to show that determinism poses a serious 
threat to our capacity to respond intelligibly to epistemic norms. Hence 
indeterminism is taken to be a necessary prerequisite of anyone being able 
to justifiably reason to a conclusion – including the conclusion that 
determinism is true. This requires a broadly internalist and deontological 
conception of epistemology, according to which the ability to responsibly 
meet our epistemic duties is a necessary component of epistemic 
justification (see especially, Lockie 2018, 7-26). If determinism robs us of 
this ability, then it also robs us of the ability to justify a deterministic 
conclusion. Hence Lockie’s argument forms the basis for an ambitious 
transcendental argument in favour of libertarian free will. 
 
There is also scope for more modest transcendental arguments, which rest 
on worries about the practical feasibility of free will scepticism. It has 
recently been suggested that we ought to interpret Strawson’s famous 
 
2  This has some clear parallels with Korsgaard’s explicitly transcendental argument in 
favour of recognising moral obligations towards others, where valuing our own practical 
identity is taken to be necessary for having any practical reasons at all, and this is taken to 
commit us to recognising the value of others’ rational nature on parallel grounds to the way 
that we must, inescapably, value our own rational nature too (Korsgaard 1996). 
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argument in Freedom and Resentment (1962) as a form of transcendental 
argument for compatibilism (Pereboom 2016; Coates 2017). Essentially, 
Strawson doubts that we can take free will scepticism seriously, given the 
commitments that come with the practical perspective forced upon us by 
our nature as practical agents. It is hardly unintelligible, on this account, to 
assert that we lack free will, but it may nonetheless be a practical 
impossibility to wholehearted maintain this view full time. 
 
For the purposes of this discussion, we will put the Strawsonian argument 
for compatibilism to one side and focus solely on ambitious versions of the 
transcendental argument for libertarianism; on the question of whether we 
might have reason to suppose that arguments in favour of determinism are 
self-refuting in some way. The point is explicit (though underdeveloped) 
in Epicurus’s argument, and is merely hinted at in Kant’s reasoning, 
though it is developed thoroughly and explicitly by Lockie.  
 
Insofar as there is a common theme here, however, the essential claims 
from which the argument is variously constructed appear to be something 
like the following: 
 
1. ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ (OIC). 
2. Actualism about alternative possibilities: That is, the thesis that 
determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise; alternative 
possibilities of the sort required for the ability to do otherwise must 
be available as things actually are, holding the past and the laws of 
nature constant (AAP). 
3. The ability to do otherwise is a necessary condition of 
responsibility (PAP). 
 
The Kantian and the Lockiean arguments invoke different further 
principles pertaining to the sort of normative pressure required for rational 
action or assertion, while the Epicurean argument leaves this unstated. 
Though presumably, for Epicurus too, there must be some implicit 
assumption about the rational requirements for asserting a thesis, where it 
is supposed that determinism might plausibly preclude us from meeting 
those requirements. The Kantian principle seems to be something like the 
following: 
 
4. In order to have any reason to do anything at all, we must have the 
ability to respond rationally to practical norms (PD). 
 
Let’s call this thesis Practical Deontologism. In contrast, the principle that 
Lockie’s argument invokes is explicitly related to epistemic duty: 
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5. In order to be justified in making any assertion, we must have the 
ability to respond rationally to epistemic norms (ED). 
 
Lockie calls this thesis Epistemic Deontologism. Either 4 (PD) or 5 (ED) 
may feasibly be invoked, alongside all or some subset of claims along the 
lines of 1-3, in an ambitious transcendental argument for libertarian free 
will. These are all claims that we will be happy to grant, at least for the 
sake of this discussion. Although they are all controversial, they also each 
seem to have a fair degree of independent plausibility. 
 
However, we hope to show that in order for any argument of this sort to 
succeed, there must also be a commitment to one of the following further 
claims, which we take to be significantly more controversial than the 
others: 
 
6. ‘Ought’ implies ‘able not to’ (OIANT). 
7. Duty entails responsibility; no one ought to do something unless 
they would be responsible for doing it (DER). 
 
Note, that if we take the truth of PAP for granted, these claims essentially 
become equivalent: The basic idea is that in order to be obligated to do x, 
we either directly need the ability to refrain from doing x, or we need to be 
responsible for doing x, where that, in turn, entails (given PAP) an ability 
to refrain from doing x. Hence what will be needed, in relation to meeting 
our practical or epistemic obligations, is not merely to be able to, but also 
to be able not to. That is, for this argumentative strategy to be effective, 
there are negative and positive preconditions of justifiably acting, 
asserting, or believing; not only must we be capable of doing what we 
ought to do, but we must also be capable of not doing what we ought to. It 
is this aspect of the argument that we take to be problematic. 
 
 
3. Determinism, Alternatives, and ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ 
 
3.1. Determinism and AAP 
 
Following Van Inwagen, we may define determinism as the conjunction of 
the following two theses: 
 
a) For every instant of time, there is a proposition that expresses the 
state of the world at that instant. 
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b) If p and q are any propositions that express the state of the world 
at some instants, then the conjunction of p with the laws of nature 
entails q.3 
 
If determinism is true, only one future course of events will be possible, 
consistent with holding fixed the laws of nature and the way that things 
were in the past. While it might seem intuitive to suppose, at first sight, 
that the truth of this thesis rules out the ability to do otherwise, there is a 
great deal of controversy surrounding this point. 
 
According to one reading – we call this the ‘actualist’ reading4 – an agent 
is only able to do otherwise, in the relevant sense, if she is able to do 
otherwise as things actually stand, holding the past and the laws of nature 
constant (AAP). On this actualist understanding, determinism rules out 
alternative possibilities.5 In contrast, many theorists favour a counterfactual or 
dispositional reading. On the counterfactual reading, an agent is able to do 
otherwise if, for instance, she would have done otherwise had she chosen 
to.6 On a dispositional reading, an agent could have done otherwise if she 
would have done otherwise had she been placed in different 
circumstances.7 Determinism is consistent with the ability to do otherwise 
in both of these senses. 
 
While AAP is controversial within the free will debate, it does seem to 
capture at least one sense of ‘able to do otherwise’, which goes beyond the 
conditional and dispositional senses, and which many take to be important 
for free will. An agent who can act otherwise in the conditional and 
dispositional senses is one that acts deliberately, acts on the basis of her 
own choices, and is adequately sensitive to important features of her 
environment. Many philosophers suppose that this suffices to establish that 
she acts freely and responsibly. However, while these abilities are almost 
universally acknowledged to be necessary for moral responsibility, many 
incompatibilist philosophers have doubts about whether they are sufficient. 
If the agent is unable to choose otherwise, given the way things actually 
are, we may worry that she cannot really, in some crucial sense, escape 
acting the way that she does. E.g. we may worry that she still lacks the 
ability to act otherwise in a sufficiently robust sense; it may still seem 
 
3 See van Inwagen (1983, 65). A similar definition is given in van Inwagen (1975, 186). 
4 See Elzein and Pernu (2017). 
5 Notable defences of the actualist analysis include Campbell (1951), Chisholm (1964), 
Lehrer (1968), van Inwagen (1983; 2000; 2004; 2008), and Kane (1999). 
6 Notable defences of the counterfactual analysis include Moore (1903), Ayer (1954), Smart 
(1961), Schlick (1939), Lewis (1981), and Berofsky (2002). 
7 Notable defences of the dispositional analysis include Fara (2008), Smith (1997; 2003) 
Vihvelin (2004; 2011; 2014). 
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unfair to blame her for what she does if she could not actually escape 
blame, given the way things are. In any case, we will grant AAP for the 
purposes of this discussion. 
 
3.2. Obligation and OIC 
 
The principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ (OIC) is popular,8 but nonetheless 
remains controversial.9 There is, however, undoubtedly a great deal of 
intuitive appeal in the idea that there is something wrong with supposing 
that demands can be placed on an agent which are impossible for that agent 
to meet. 
 
In order for this principle to be utilised effectively in any transcendental 
argument for free will, however, we will need to say something about the 
sense of ‘can’ invoked by the principle. Specifically, we will need to 
suppose that the principle is convincing even granted an actualist reading 
of ‘can’. That is, we must suppose that an agent cannot be obligated to do 
something unless that agent is able to do it, as things actually stand, holding 
the past and the laws of nature constant. If we wish to show that 
determinism undermines our ability to do what we ought to do, in the sense 
relevant to OIC, then we had better suppose that this pertains to the same 
sense of ‘able to’ according to which determinism might plausibly be 
thought to rob us of the ability to do otherwise. 
 
For the sake of this discussion, we will grant both OIC, and that the sense 
of ‘able to do otherwise’ that is relevant to OIC is that invoked by AAP. 
That is, we will grant that determinism rules out alternative possibilities, 
and that it does so in a way that entails that we are unable to do otherwise, 





8  The principle is commonly thought to originate with Kant (1998/1781; 2017/1797; 
1998/1793; 1996/1793), and was famously defended by Moore (1922). Since then it is more 
often taken to be a basic platitude than explicitly argued for, but there are some explicit 
defences of the principle. See Sapontzis (1991), Griffin (1992), Streumer (2003; 2007; 
2010), and Vranas (2007). For defences of related principles, see Graham (2011) and 
Kühler (2013). 
9  Notable critiques include Lemmon (1962), Williams (1965), Brouwer (1969), Trigg 
(1971), van Fraassen (1973), Brown (1977), Sinnott-Armstrong (1984; 1988), Rescher 
(1987, chap. 2, pp. 26-54), Saka (2000), Fischer (2003), and Heintz (2013). Cf. Kekes 
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3.3. Normative Pressures and PAP 
 
There are various ways in which a transcendental argument might run. It 
may only be necessary to appeal to our capacity to respond to normative 
pressures, in which case it is not obvious we need to invoke the idea of 
responsibility at all. But the argument could proceed via a consideration of 
responsibility if what is taken to be important is not merely the ability to 
respond to normative pressures, but the ability to be responsible for doing 
so. In the latter case, the argument may need to make use of PAP: The 
principle that alternative possibilities are a required for responsibility. 
 
PAP has been under frequent attack at least since Frankfurt’s famous 
attempt to refute the principle (Frankfurt 1969). For present purposes, we 
will accept PAP, although later we will have reason to consider whether 
the principle is of central importance to plausible versions of the 
transcendental argument. 
 
In any case, what any version of the argument will need is some appeal to 
a normative principle, which bears on when we could have an intelligible 
basis for making an assertion or for justifying our commitment to a 
conclusion. Rational justifications for either belief or action must be taken 
to depend on some sort of ability to respond to normative pressures – 
whether practical or epistemic. It is this ability that will, if the argument is 
convincing, be threatened by determinism. 
 
3.4. The Basic form of Transcendental Argument 
 
Suppose that we take the principles above to be defensible. This gives us a 
framework for constructing an ambitious version of the transcendental 
argument for libertarianism. A simple argument will not rest on PAP, but 
will instead appeal directly to worries about our ability to respond to 
normative pressures. This will go as follows: 
 
(1) If determinism is true, then nobody is able to do otherwise (from 
AAP). 
(2) If nobody is able to do otherwise, then nobody is able to assert or 
conclude otherwise (uncontroversial entailment). 
(3) If nobody is able to assert or conclude otherwise, then nobody 
ought to assert or conclude otherwise (from OIC). 
(4) If nobody ought to assert or conclude otherwise, then nobody can 
have an adequate rational basis to assert or to justifiably conclude 
otherwise (from either PD or ED). 
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(5) If determinism is true, then nobody could have an adequate 
rational basis to assert or justifiably conclude otherwise (from 1-
4). 
(6) If determinism is true, then nobody could have an adequate 
rational basis for any actual assertion or conclusion (from…?) 
 
The problem here is that (6) does not follow from the preceding steps. It 
certainly doesn’t follow from (5) alone. In fact, we only seem entitled to 
(5). Clearly, however, (5) is a weaker claim than the one needed to 
establish that any argument for determinism is self-refuting. This would 
establish that the proponent of determinism cannot have any justification 
for asserting any alternative conclusion. This looks unproblematic. Insofar 
as one takes oneself to have a decisive rational basis for asserting a 
particular conclusion, it follows rather trivially that one cannot be justified 
in asserting the opposite conclusion instead. To render the determinist’s 
stance problematic, we need a stronger conclusion: That the proponent of 
the argument for determinism cannot have any rational justification for 
asserting her actual conclusion. 
 
This could be done either by invoking a principle linking responsibility to 
duty (DER) alongside PAP, or by invoking the principle that ‘ought’ 
implies ‘able not to’ (OIANT). In either case, we need some means of 
supposing that the capacity not to fulfil a duty is a necessary condition of 
being duty-bound, so we end up either directly or indirectly, arriving at 
something like OIANT. 
 
It’s fairly easy to see how the inclusion of OIANT on its own would help 
to establish a strong enough conclusion: 
 
(1) If determinism is true, then nobody is able to do otherwise (from 
AAP). 
(2) If nobody is able to do otherwise, then it follows that nobody who 
makes an assertion or reaches a conclusion could assert or 
conclude anything other than what they actually do 
(uncontroversial entailment). 
(3) If nobody is able to assert or conclude otherwise than they actually 
do, then nobody ought to assert or conclude as they actually do 
(from OIANT). 
(4) If nobody ought to assert or conclude as they actually do, then 
nobody can have an adequate rational basis to assert or to 
justifiably conclude as they actually do (from either PD or ED). 
(5) If determinism is true, then nobody could have an adequate 
rational basis for any actual assertion or conclusion (from 1-4). 
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This argument would entail that the determinist would have no rational 
basis, were determinism true, on which to justify asserting or concluding 
anything – including the claim that determinism is true. 
 
While the argument could be constructed by appeal OIANT, another route 
to the same conclusion would arrive at something that entails OIANT, but 
would commit to it indirectly via PAP and DER, as follows: 
 
(1) If determinism is true, then nobody is able to do otherwise (from 
AAP). 
(2) If nobody is able to do otherwise, then nobody can be responsible 
for anything that they actually do (from PAP). 
(3) If nobody is responsible for anything they actually do, then nobody 
can be responsible with respect to the assertions they actually 
make or the conclusions they actually reach (uncontroversial 
entailment). 
(4) If nobody is responsible with respect to the assertions they actually 
make or the conclusions they actually reach, then nobody ought to 
make the assertions they make or reach the conclusions that they 
reach (from DER). 
(5) If nobody ought to make the assertions that they make or reach the 
conclusions that they reach, then nobody can have any rational 
justification for their conclusions or assertions (from PD or ED). 
(6) If determinism is true, then nobody can have any rational 
justification for their conclusions or assertions (from 1-5). 
 
The argument may then invoke either OIANT or else PAP alongside DER. 
The problem, however, is that neither OIANT nor DER are plausible. 
When there is a compelling practical reason for doing something or a 
compelling epistemic reason for believing something, we will argue that 
these pressures are typically independent both of whether we can avoid 
responding to the pressure and of whether we would be responsible for 
responding to the pressure. That is, practical and epistemic normative 
pressures involve the ability to respond to our actual reasons or our actual 
evidence, and rely neither on our ability to avoid responding to these, nor 
on whether we would be responsible for responding.  
 
We might suppose that an epistemically rational agent aims to have beliefs 
that “track” the truth and that a practically rational agent aims to make 
choices that that “track” their reasons for action.10 If normative pressures 
 
10 While the former idea is notably associated with (Nozick 1981) and the latter view is 
associated with Fischer and Ravizza (1998; see, also, Fischer 1987), the claim being made 
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are understood in terms of the obligation to make our assertions and 
conclusions, as far as possible, track what there is reason to assert or to 
conclude, it’s not at all obvious that either responsibility or the ability to 
assert or conclude otherwise should be relevant to these pressures at all. 
While an agent’s lack of freedom or responsibility with respect to these 
pressures may well have an important bearing on whether they can 
intelligibly be held accountable for their beliefs or assertions, they will not 
obviously have any parallel bearing on the strength of the agent’s reasons 
for asserting or believing what they do. 
 
 
4. The Implausibility of OIANT and DER 
 
4.1. The Problem with OIANT 
 
While OIC might seem highly intuitive, OIANT appears to be far less so. 
While some argue that the two principle are symmetrical in such a way that 
we ought to accept one so long as we accept the other (e.g. Haji 2002, see 
especially page 29), it has also been noted that the alleged symmetry is 
hardly obvious, and unlike OIC, OIANT is rarely seen as similarly 
axiomatic (Nelkin 2011, 102). Moreover, we might suppose that there is 
an intuitive rationale for endorsing OIC that simply does not apply to 
OIANT; we maintain that OIC is plausible because it seems unreasonably 
demanding to insist that anyone ought to do the impossible. The fact that 
something is unavoidable, in contrast, certainly does not entail that it 
would be unreasonably demanding to suppose that someone ought to do it. 
 
Moreover, whether we focus on the epistemic or the practical realm (e.g. 
on the moral or on the prudential), we will easily find cases in which this 
principle appears highly counterintuitive. For instance, suppose that you 
are unable to put your hand into a flame and hold it there for five minutes. 
Does this really plausibly entail that it’s false that you ought to avoid 
putting your hand in a flame and holding it there for five minutes? Or 
suppose that you are unable to avoid believing that 1 + 1 = 2. Does this 
entail that that you lack a strong rational justification for believing that 1 + 
1 = 2? Likewise, suppose that you are unable to murder someone in cold 
blood. Does this plausibly entail that it’s false that you ought not to murder 
 
here is committed neither to Nozick’s externalism about epistemology nor to Fischer and 
Ravizza’s semi-compatibilism about responsibility. In relation to knowledge, the point is 
that a rational agent aims to have truth-responsive beliefs, where this may be understood as 
a response to an epistemic duty, consistent with the sort of internalist epistemic 
deontologism defended by Lockie (2018), say. And while we are suggesting that practical 
rationality requires the ability to respond to reasons, we are not arguing, as Fischer and 
Ravizza do, that this suffices for moral responsibility. 
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anyone cold blood? In all of these cases, it seems plausible to suppose that 
the answer is no.  
 
The reasons for this cut to what is distinctive about normative pressures. 
Perhaps you cannot put your hand into a flame and hold it there for five 
minutes, but this is hardly relevant to the reasons why you ought not to do 
such a thing. You ought not to do it because you have a very strong 
prudential interest in avoiding unnecessary pain and injury. This prudential 
interest will still exist regardless of whether you cannot help but avoid it. 
Similarly, your reason for believing that 1 + 1 = 2 seems to be just as strong 
regardless of whether you have the ability to doubt it. The reason is 
provided by the strength of the mathematical case in favour of concluding 
that 1 + 1 = 2; that is the strength of the evidence you have on the basis of 
which to suppose it’s true. Likewise, your reasons for not murdering 
someone in cold blood are based on the fact that it would be morally wrong, 
not on the fact that you are able to do it. 
 
If we accept OIC, this entails that it would be false that someone who is 
incapable of avoiding putting their hand in a flame ought not to do so. The 
obvious rationale is that it cannot be a good idea to do something if that 
something is literally impossible to do. The practical plausibility of this 
view appears to be grounded in the fact that it’s never practically a good 
idea to attempt the impossible. 
 
Our point, however, is that it may well be worth attempting the inevitable, 
especially if there is a causal link between your attempt and your success 
in that attempt. It may well be inevitable that the moment you realise your 
hand is in the flame, you retract it fairly quickly. But this doesn’t obviously 
entail that doing so is not also a good idea. You have strong reasons to do 
it based on the fact that it’s in your interests and you are easily capable of 
doing it. Similarly, if we accept OIC, a person who is incapable of 
believing that 1 + 1 = 2 is not a person who ought to believe that 1 + 1 = 2. 
But this does not entail that a person who cannot help but believe it has no 
reason to believe it. 
 
A plausible form of epistemic deontologism will entail that we have a duty 
to believe what there is strong evidence for believing, insofar as we are 
capable of understanding and accurately assessing that evidence. There is 
no obvious parallel for supposing that we also need the ability to doubt 
what there is overwhelming evidence to believe. In the case of simple 
mathematical truths, most of us are likely to find these fairly indubitable. 
But it seems odd, to say the least, that we should suppose (in a stark 
reversal of the Cartesian approach!) that a truth’s status as indubitable 
actually positively undermines our justification for believing it. 
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One worry may be that we must be committed, in principle, to a strong 
parallel between ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’ requirements. For instance, 
Lockie argues that because  
 
determinism globally denies us the negative, ‘irrational’, 
‘unjustified’ aspects of any internalist value terms, it removes 
from us the ability to distinguish and use the positive 
‘rational’, ‘justified’ aspects of such terms. (If one affects to 
make no sense of anything being not red, one cannot 
distinguish and use the predicate red). (Lockie 2018, 182)  
 
It is precisely this principle, however, that we take issue with. 
 
Firstly, the parallel between supposing there are no unjustified beliefs or 
actions, on the one hand, and “affecting to make no sense of redness”, on 
the other, is dubious: The claim is not that we can make no sense of any 
belief being unjustified, but that if determinism should turn out to be true, 
then as a matter of fact, nobody is under an obligation not to hold the 
beliefs they have or under an obligation not to make the assertions that they 
do. There is an important difference. Consider the idea of non-existence; it 
is a simple tautology that there exist no things that don’t exist. But we can 
understand the concept of non-existence even if, as a matter of fact, there 
are no things that don’t exist. We are able to make sense of the concept 
because we are able to think in modal terms; we can contemplate 
hypothetical scenarios. 
 
There is a great deal of disagreement regarding whether or not determinism 
is true. Even if we suppose that determinism is true, and we embrace 
something like OIC, it’s not at all obvious that we should be unable to 
make any sense of the idea that some people ought to believe or assert 
something different to what they do. This requires that we can imagine a 
world in which determinism is false, and can think about the obligations 
we would be under in such a world. This is perfectly consistent with 
supposing that, as a matter of fact, nobody has such obligations as things 
actually are.11 
 
More importantly, the relevant discrimination capacities do not seem to 
have been located in quite the right place: the normative pressure comes 
 
11 Compare the point here with a somewhat parallel argument, which Stroud (1968) makes 
in response to epistemic versions of the transcendental argument: Is it obvious that we need 
there to be objects in the external world in order to make sense of our experiences? Perhaps 
all we need is to have the impression or the belief that there are. Much the same seems to 
be true with respect to irrational or unjustified beliefs. 
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from the strength of the evidence. The relevant ability involves being able 
to discriminate between strong evidence and weak evidence. A person may 
well have the ability to discriminate between strong and weak evidence, 
even if they are not capable of believing anything on the basis of weak 
evidence, or of doubting something for which there is overwhelmingly 
strong evidence. 
 
4.2. The Problem with DER 
 
We maintain that there is a parallel issue with DER, the principle that in 
order to have a reason to do or believe something, we would have to be 
held responsible for doing or believing it. 
 
Again, this appears to misplace the source of the relevant normative 
pressures. The reasons we have to believe something are dependent on the 
strength of the evidence in its favour; not on the epistemic agent’s 
blameworthiness or praiseworthiness for so believing. Similarly, the 
practical reasons we have for acting depend on the moral or prudential case 
in favour of so acting. Again, where there are strong reasons to do 
something, these reasons are typically not dependent on whether an agent 
would be praiseworthy for doing it or blameworthy for failing to do it. 
 
We are not arguing that claims about whether an agent is morally or 
epistemically blameworthy or praiseworthy are entirely independent of the 
agent’s moral or epistemic reasons: It is clear that if anyone is ever 
epistemically praiseworthy, a necessary precondition of this is that the 
agent has good evidence on the basis of which she arrives at her belief. 
Similarly, if anyone is ever morally or prudentially praiseworthy, a 
necessary precondition of this is that she had good reasons on the basis of 
which to act as she did. What we deny, however, is that there is any 
entailment in the opposite direction: that is, that being praiseworthy is a 
precondition of having good moral or epistemic reasons. Praiseworthiness, 
if there is such a thing, depends on there being independent sources of 
epistemic and practical normativity, not vice-versa. 
 
For one thing, is seems that agents may not be sophisticated enough to be 
held responsible for their beliefs and actions but may nonetheless have 
reasons for those beliefs and actions. Consider a five-year-old child who 
refrains from playing with the loose electrical cables coming out of a live 
plug socket on the basis that a parent has told her not to. Plausibly, the 
child is not responsible for her actions since she doesn’t really appreciate 
the reasons why she ought not to play with the electrical cables. But 
plausibly she ought not to play with them. When her parents tell her that 
she ought not to touch that live wire, they can hardly be accused of lying 
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to her. She ought not to touch that live wire. The reason why she ought not 
to touch the wire is certainly not that she will be praiseworthy if she avoids 
touching it and blameworthy if she touches it (neither of those claims 
seems plausibly true). In fact, her responsibility doesn’t come into it. 
Rather, she ought not to touch it because she’s likely to receive a nasty 
electric shock if she does. 
 
With respect to epistemic reasons, it seems even more clear that the 
normative pressures arising from the strength of evidence are not in any 
way derived from the agent’s status as responsible. Suppose the five-year-
old works out that 5 x 5 = 25. Perhaps this is quite a difficult calculation 
for a child or her age and abilities, and it would therefore be unreasonable 
to suppose that she could be held responsible for successfully working it 
out. It would certainly be unreasonable to blame her for getting it wrong. 
None of this seems to have much bearing, however, on why we might 
suppose that she ought to believe that 5 x 5 = 25. She ought to believe it 
because it’s true and because it’s strongly supported by mathematical 
logic. 
 
Again, the point is that normative pressures arise from facts about what 
there is evidence to believe and what there is reason to do. These facts do 
not depend on whether we are responsible. The norms that govern rational 
belief and behaviour are independent of considerations about whether 





While there are a number of plausible principles underpinning 
transcendental arguments for the freedom of the will, they also appear to 
rest, inevitably, on some principles that we may have good grounds for 
rejecting. Even if our duties rest on our ability to fulfil them, it is not at all 
obvious that they similarly rest on any parallel ability not to fulfil them. 
And while we may have reasons to suppose that our responsibility in 
relation to our beliefs and actions depends on our reasons, it is far from 
obvious that there is any dependence in the other direction. It seems, then, 
that if any transcendental argument in favour of free will is to succeed, it 
will have to be a significantly more modest form of argument than the sort 
we have been considering here. It is difficult to see why the determinist 
could not have good reasons to assert her position without risk of 
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